黑料正能量

Who should have a say in a given decision听for it to count as democratic? This is the question with which the so-called听democratic boundary problem听is concerned. Two main 鈥渟olutions鈥� have emerged in the literature: the all-affected principle (AAP) and the all-subjected principle (ASP). My aim in this paper is to question the presuppositions underpinning the boundary-problem debate. Scholars have proceeded by taking听诲别尘辞肠谤补肠测听for granted, treating it as an ultimate value. Consequently, the best solution to the boundary problem has been framed as the one that most loyally reflects the value of democracy. But it is not at all obvious that democracy is best conceptualised as an ultimate value. Arguably, democracy marks out a family of decision-making systems that are themselves justified by appeal to how they reflect and promote important values in particular circumstances. The values in question range from equality and self-determination, to peace, security, and respect for fundamental rights. In other words, what we call 鈥渄emocracy鈥� is听itself听one of several possible solutions to the boundary problem (i.e., the problem of听who听should take part in a given decision): a solution that is contingently justified by appeal to a variety of different values. This means that neither the AAP nor the ASP can provide one-size-fits-all solutions to the problem.